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This month, three high-profile visits within six days showed how the conflict between Morocco and Algeria is intensifying the policies of European governments in the Maghreb.
On July 15 and 16, French Prime Minister Sebastien Lecornu led a large delegation of ministers to Morocco, including a quick interaction between Paris and Rabat. At about the same time, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune was in Berlin seeking to expand Algeria’s alliance with Germany. Four days later, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez arrived in Algiers, continuing his efforts to mend relations damaged by Madrid’s switch to Morocco.
The biggest flaw in the race is the Western Sahara. Morocco controls many territories and is associated with independence, or the idea of independence, a major test of its foreign relations. Algiers supports the Polisario Front’s demands for independence and has responded strongly when European governments have accepted Rabat’s role in the region.
Both countries have a lot of opportunities. Morocco offers intelligence cooperation with the rebels, assistance in managing migration, access to funds and access to its financial networks in Africa. Algeria has large natural gas reserves, a large domestic market and significant security and diplomatic interests in the Maghreb and Sahel.
European governments cannot manage these two relationships alone. Decisions that strengthen relations with one can reshape diplomatic, economic and security ties with the other.
France provides a clear example.
In 2024, President Emmanuel Macron supported Moroccan sovereignty in Western Sahara and described Morocco’s idea of independence as a basis for resolving the conflict. This decision helped to end the long-standing conflict between Paris and Rabat, but it caused a crisis in Algeria, which recalled its ambassador.
Lecornu’s visit showed that France does not see its 2024 reform as a diplomatic concession. It is developing a broader partnership with Morocco around the world.
The two governments have advanced cooperation on energy, finance, security, migration, education and infrastructure. They also discussed a direct electricity link that could bring renewable energy from Morocco to France and continued planning for future cooperation.
For France, Morocco provides a stable partner at a time when French influence has declined in the Sahel. Several governments in the region have expelled French troops, cut ties with Paris or sought other security measures. In contrast, Morocco has expanded its economic and diplomatic presence in West Africa through banking, telecommunications, infrastructure and religious and security cooperation.
So Rabat gives Paris a way to maintain influence in Africa while creating new trade, energy and security projects. In return, Morocco gains money, diplomatic prestige and international aid in Western Sahara.
The depth of France’s commitment is perhaps clearest in what Paris seems willing to ignore.
When Lecornu visited Morocco, new reports fueled allegations that Moroccan intelligence had used spying software developed by Israel at Pegasus against French officials, including Lecornu when he was in government as a minister of state. Morocco has repeatedly denied access to or use of Pegasus.
The allegations did not detract from the visit. The two governments have publicly celebrated their security partnership and continue to work towards a broader partnership, showing the importance Paris now attaches to its relationship with Rabat.
This decision has paid off.
Relations between France and Algeria have long been strained by disputes over colonial history, immigration and security. Macron’s decision on Western Sahara escalated the recurring conflict into a major rupture.
The defense agreement stalled, French companies faced mounting obstacles and French wheat was excluded from Algerian tenders. Paris and Algiers have cautiously reopened talks, but France has shown no willingness to change the policies that led to the crisis.
Algeria did not force France to change its mind. But it showed that an alliance with Morocco could renew France’s economic, diplomatic and security ties with Algeria.
Spain faced similar pressure after making a similar decision.
In 2022, the Sanchez government renounced Spain’s neutrality and expressed Morocco’s desire for independence as a solid, authentic and credible basis for resolving the conflict in Western Sahara. The decision helped Madrid settle a bitter dispute with Rabat, but led to Algeria’s return.
Algiers recalled its ambassador, suspended its ten-year treaty with Spain and halted most non-gas trade. Spanish exports to Algeria fell, although Algeria continued to honor its gas contracts.
Again, Algeria was unable to force the Western government to change its policy. But it may force the government to change its diplomacy.
Spain tried to improve its relations with Algeria without abandoning its alliance with Morocco. Sanchez’s visit on July 20 to Algiers provided a clear sign of this renaissance. The two governments agreed to revive the bilateral strategic alliance and deepen cooperation on energy, finance, migration and security.
The problem in Madrid is that all these relationships are important. Algeria remains a major gas hub, while Morocco is important for Spain’s trade, counter-terrorism and immigration policies.
Madrid also remembers the Ceuta crisis of 2021, when Morocco appeared to loosen the border restrictions in a diplomatic dispute, allowing thousands of people to enter Spain.
The conflict with Algeria, meanwhile, is destroying trade and difficult energy negotiations. Sanchez is trying to do something difficult: to protect the relationship between Spain and Morocco and to rebuild the relationship with Algeria that this relationship has been damaged.
Tebboune’s simultaneous visit to Berlin reflects Algeria’s efforts to expand its ties with Europe.
Germany and Algeria discussed a deep cooperation on energy, finance, industry, migration and security, including the possibility of including the export of Maghrebi hydrogen to Europe.
The relationship between Germany and Algeria has its economic and intellectual foundations and cannot be reduced to competition with Morocco. But close ties with Berlin expand Algeria’s options in Europe beyond France.
Morocco and Algeria are no longer competing for Western aid. Through energy, migration, security cooperation, market access and regional influence, they are increasing the way European governments organize their relations across the Maghreb.
France has made Morocco a central pillar of its regional strategy. Spain is rebuilding relations with Algeria without losing ties with Rabat. Algeria is expanding its European integration while France is closing in on Morocco. The competition did not divide Europe into permanent blocs, but Morocco and Algeria have been effective in getting European governments to organize their North African policies around them.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect Al Jazeera’s influence.