How the armed forces are reshaping the conflict in Mali and the wider Sahel | Story

Bamako, Mali The ambush that killed at least 50 Malian soldiers and struck the Malian Army (FAMa) and the Russian Army in Africa near the northern town of Anefis on July 18 was beyond measure.

It also confirmed the growth of Mali’s armed forces, showing the limits of the military government’s security, despite growing military support from Russia.

The Malian military confirmed the attack and said it had launched protests, while the Africa Corps later released footage that showed protesters firing on hiding militants.

The attack is the latest in a series of coordinated actions in northern Mali since April, asking why the forces are working together, whether the Bamako security strategy is working, whether Russia’s military role has changed – and it hasn’t, and what this conflict could mean for the Sahel.

Why are separatist and Islamist forces fighting together?

The July 18 ambush was claimed by the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), a coalition of Tuareg separatist groups, and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an affiliate of al-Qaeda in the Sahel.

Until recently, such an alliance would have seemed impossible because they have different long-term political goals. The FLA wants independence or autonomy for northern Mali, while the JNIM wants to establish an administration based on their interpretation of Islamic law throughout the region.

For Héni Nsaibia, West Africa’s chief expert on the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) project, the answer lies in a shared enemy rather than a shared ideology.

“The Tuareg-led separatists and JNIM are fighting together because they have a common enemy in the Malian army and their Russian counterparts from the Africa Corps,” Nsaibia told Al Jazeera.

“In doing so, they act as power multipliers for each other, allowing them to accumulate wealth and coordinate their efforts against their enemies more effectively.

For the Malian military, the alliance makes attacks harder to anticipate and harder to repel, allowing forces to combine local knowledge, personnel and operational skills and achieve different objectives.

The military government’s decision to withdraw from the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement, request the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and expand military cooperation with Russia also changed the conflict. The breakdown of the peace process removed one way of managing the relationship between Bamako and the northern armed forces, while the military conflict encouraged the former rivals to join forces with the common enemy.

The change was most evident in the offensive that began in several parts of the country in April, expanding the Malian and Russian forces across several borders. Recently, the fighting around Anefis has shown that the alliance can not only initiate operations at the same time but also strengthen the pressure on the most important military forces.

Negotiations have been abandoned and military confrontation is becoming the main method, the forces that were once competing have found more incentives to unite on the battlefield.

Has Russia changed the course of the war in Mali?

Since replacing the Wagner Group as Moscow’s main military force in Mali, the Africa Corps has been an important partner of the Malian military.

Its personnel have provided military support alongside the Malian military, while Russian drones and aircraft have enhanced the military’s surveillance and strike capabilities. This capability has strengthened the military’s ability to respond to attacks and defend key positions.

“Russia has helped strengthen the Malian army, which was vulnerable to attack, and has provided more support on the battlefield,” Nimi Princewill, a regional analyst for West Africa and the Sahel, told Al Jazeera.

But this attack, as well as the capture of Kidal earlier, show that the support of the Kremlin forces has not changed the whole picture. The army captured Kidal, a major town in the north of the country that the Tuareg rebels had held for nearly a decade, in November 2023, but the Tuareg and fighters retook the town in April this year.

Rather than changing the conflict, Moscow’s military support appears to have bolstered military power without addressing the political, governance and security forces that continue to fuel violence.

Recent developments reinforce this assessment. Convoys traveling to the north of Mali continue to be ambushed frequently, especially on the roads connecting Gao, Anefis and other military bases, showing the insecurity of the armed forces despite increasing Russian support.

The shift away from Western security partners also changed the type of support available. Although the Africa Corps has strengthened Mali’s military capabilities, the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has ended the international presence that provides administrative, monitoring and intelligence support in many parts of northern Mali.

The result is an army that has excelled in direct combat but continues to struggle to defend a large, distant field against ever-increasing forces.

Has the Bamako approach been successful?

The failure of the Bamako security strategy raises more questions about whether it is translating military gains into lasting security.

Since taking power in 2020, Mali’s military government has stepped up its military strategy, ending long-standing alliances with Western allies and strengthening security ties with Russia.

But the repeated ambushes around Anefis and the supply routes to the north show that the measurable benefits of this route on the battlefield have not been translated into a sustainable and sustainable strategy.

Moreover, the growing cooperation between the armed forces with different objectives shows that the Bamako strategy has not prevented them from changing and re-framing the conflict.

What would this mean for the wider Sahel?

The effects of the Anefis ambush continue in Mali.

JNIM, an al-Qaeda affiliate, is already operating across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, as fighting continues to spread across the Sahel.

The ongoing war also presents challenges to the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), whose members are all facing military violence despite expanding military cooperation. The agreement was designed to strengthen collective security, but growing protests show that the intergovernmental agreement is being replaced by a potentially transformative alliance between the armed forces.

At the same time, Mali’s withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has reduced the possibility of cooperation with neighboring countries that are facing many of the same security threats.

If the FLA-JNIM partnership becomes permanent, it could promote similar intelligence cooperation elsewhere in the Sahel, and increase efforts to have military units whose operations have already begun at the borders of the countries.

“AES was meant to mean that our security was our business.” But when Mali bled, Niger came out, because the armed forces attacking these groups do not recognize the unity of the countries of the Sahel as they knew ECOWAS. Jazeera.

It is not clear whether the strategic partnership between FLA and JNIM is sustainable. But the Anefis ambush shows that as Mali’s security strategies change, the armed forces are changing in response, with consequences that could extend beyond Mali’s borders.