Evolution on Fire: Iran’s ‘Axis of resistance’ during the war | US-Israel War on Iran News

A memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed between the United States and Iran has halted more than three months of direct hostilities. The deal, which also includes removing the US military fence and establishing a $300bn reconstruction fund for Iran, has dramatically changed the geopolitical landscape.

According to a research paper and the Al Jazeera Center for Studies (AJCS), the MOU represents a step back from Washington’s first war goals, abandoning the goal of regime change. The plan also marks the end of Israel’s ambitions for undisputed regional sovereignty, while the US recognizes Iran as a legitimate regional entity.

Recommended Articles

list of things 3end of series

However, this long-standing conflict has brought about a very stressful test “Axis of resistance” of Iran – a group of armed groups allied with Iran, including Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, and militias in Iraq.

As the dust settled, Al Jazeera spoke to Iranian experts to assess the loss of technology, the evolution of technology, and the future potential of Tehran’s network to answer a critical question: Is Iran’s regional deterrence destroyed forever, or is it turning into a permanent, stable force?

The destruction of technology and its prevention

For years, Iran has relied on allies in the region as part of its “security front” doctrine designed to keep conflicts away from its borders.

But interestingly, during the US-Israel war – with Iran’s share, weapons, and national security – Tehran chose to rely more on its missiles, drones, and control the Strait of Hormuz, instead of unleashing all the power of its allies.

In fact, several of the members of the “axis of resistance”, especially the Houthis, acted cautiously when they could open new avenues in the war.

That self-restraint is very important in the discussion about the future of the axis. Has Iran’s regional deterrence been completely destroyed, or is it turning into a loose network, which is difficult to destroy?

Nader Hashemi, a professor of Middle East politics at Georgetown University, says that the war has shown the weakness of Iran’s regional theory.

“Right now, the Axis is (weaker) than it has been since it was created,” Hashemi said. He also said that during the war, Iran’s national security took priority over Hezbollah, considering that the main defense system was “very weak”.

Supporters of this argument can point to the lack of threats carried out by Hezbollah and Iran-allied groups in Iraq, compared to Iran’s armed forces. But it does not mean that this theory has failed, said Mr. Negar Mortazavi, head of the Center for International Policy.

In fact, Mortazavi believes that this theory has undergone a fundamental change.

“It exposed its limits and also encouraged reforms to prevent immigration,” Mortazavi said. While regional allies remained important to open new channels and create depth, he said that Iran’s long-range weapons, cheap drones, and power on the Strait of Hormuz became the new basis of its security.

This also highlights the ban on Iran. In the past, the doctrine of future security meant that the threat of war in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere would make Iran’s enemies wary. But Israel’s willingness to launch a war on multiple fronts, showing the weakness of that power and its willingness to bear the cost of the conflict, weakened Iran’s deterrence. By showing that it can also absorb and retaliate directly, in a more powerful way than its allies, Iran has also imposed sanctions, in a different way.

For Ahmed al-Komi, a Palestinian journalist and researcher based in Tehran, it is not proof of failure. He also pointed out that the Axis tactics, especially Hezbollah’s ability to withstand heavy blows, surprised many.

“It was the right decision (made by Iran) in the first place to cooperate with its allies,” said al-Komi, saying that Tehran continues to see the network as an important line in the fight against the presence of the US and Israel.

The problem of reconstruction

The next test will be rebuilding.

The MOU promises to free up Iran’s economy and establish a global infrastructure fund – and while there will be efforts to limit what Iran can do with the money – questions are rising whether Tehran will focus on domestic recovery or resources to rebuild the power of its battered proxies.

Hashemi predicts that restoring the government will be very important. “The most important thing is to protect, renew Iran’s drone and missile capabilities, support the (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) and restore Iran’s cooperation,” Hashemi said. “Everything will go to the citizens if there is anything left,” leaving financial aid to allies and regions that depend heavily on Iran’s faltering economy.

Mortazavi sees economic recovery as a barrier to social cohesion. He hopes for a two-pronged approach in which Tehran invests in domestic reforms to stabilize markets while also protecting its military restrictions. The army chiefs, he said, “will give priority to restoring national security, renewing major powers, and strengthening regional cooperation as insurance against new conflicts”.

Transforming into distributed energy

Some of Iran’s allies have been hit hard in the past few years, and the war has exposed limits to the idea that they will simply open new weapons whenever Iran is attacked. But the rulers were not finished. In fact, it seems to be changing shape.

One result is a great deal of fragmentation. The war destroyed large visible military units and supply lines.

It also showed that each member of the axis has its own local constraints. Hezbollah is fighting a war of survival in Lebanon, while its domestic opponents see an opportunity. Iraqi forces enter the government, giving them a different perspective, and often tend to settle down. The Houthis have their own – stop – war in Yemen, keeping a good balance between threatening enough to deter regional enemies from attacking, while not causing enough chaos for neighboring countries to decide to oust them immediately.

Al-Komi says that independence is a deliberate policy of the post-war situation. Maintaining the independence of coalition forces allows Tehran to deny direct responsibility while remaining united against US and Israeli influence. “The current and future Iran will continue to strengthen this relationship and maintain its independence,” Al-Komi said.

Mortazavi admits that the rulers may be less dependent on infrastructure and more dependent on asymmetric instruments.

“The result will be a leaner, more sustainable, and more technologically flexible,” focusing on military capabilities like cyber warfare, intelligence, and strategic missiles instead of conventional military forces.

Hashemi points out that while groups like the Houthis have historically been independent, they are ultimately “as powerful and effective as the Islamic Republic can be”. Despite the damage, it is expected that Tehran will make a strong effort to restore the network because it provides an important opportunity for the regional sector.

The power of the future

That ability is why rulers cannot disappear. It gives Iran leverage in regional negotiations, and it gives Iran more cards to play.

But the war has shown that the network may be better understood as a group of united actors who are ready to work together, but when it is clear their views in the area, how to attack, and the interests of Iran.

Al-Komi says that Tehran is already planning what will happen in the future.

“One of the most important things that Iran will learn is that it will be ready for the next war,” he warned, predicting that support for the move would continue through direct and shadowy channels.

As Mortazavi briefly explained, the region is entering a controlled competition. Iran’s allies may now be just one part of a non-proliferation, integrated, but still robust, flexible strategy designed to project power in a volatile Middle East.