The Iraqi Prime Minister has the title, but not the power | Thoughts

Ali al-Zaidi met US President Donald Trump in the Oval Office on Tuesday as the Iraqi Prime Minister. He lifted the head. Power was another matter.

Eleven weeks earlier, after months of paralysis, the Shia coalition known as the Coordination Framework took just 25 minutes to elect him. This emergency agreement was made under great pressure from Washington DC.

The United States Treasury has stopped the flow of Iraqi dollars, money sent from New Jersey to the Central Bank of Iraq. Nouri al-Maliki, the former prime minister, and the main contender to return to the ministry had to abandon his proposal due to Washington’s veto.

Al-Zaidi, a 40-year-old banker with no political background, is the man left behind. He has less responsibility for the Baghdad ballot box than for pressure from Trump’s Treasury.

In 2024, the Central Bank of Iraq banned al-Zaidi’s subsidiary, Al-Janoob Islamic Bank, from selling US dollars as part of a plan to restrict the flow of dollars to Iran. He was never charged. Neither the bank nor the man is allowed at this time. But the file is there. His presence could give Washington another source of support if al-Zaidi drags his feet.

Real power in Baghdad is now in the hands of one man. Tom Barrack holds three positions at once: ambassador to Turkey, ambassador to Syria, and now ambassador to Iraq. Its influence is less on negotiation than Washington’s economic contribution to Baghdad. Iraq’s oil money is kept in an account at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York. In April, Washington banned remittances of about $500m from the proceeds and suspended parts of its defense. Oil accounts for nearly 90 percent of Iraq’s budget. Barrack does not need to threaten the military while the commanders he represents can directly access the financial system on which Iraq depends.

Washington’s demand that Iraq bring all forces under government control could not be resolved. Shia Cleric Muqtada al-Sadr disbanded his Saraya al-Salam militia at the end of May. Some militias such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Imam Ali have announced plans to surrender their weapons or place them under government control. That’s real travel. But Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba, two groups closely tied to Tehran, have refused to fully disarm. In their own words, their tools are not commercial. Washington has responded in kind. US strikes to kill Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters this year; The Treasury Board has approved seven named military officers. Baghdad has set a September 30 deadline for disarmament, the same day that the remaining US troops are expected to leave Iraq. Whether the most critical groups will fold by then is still an open question that Washington has not answered honestly.

Even Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s authority is limited here, as always. Al-Sistani’s 2014 fatwa created the founding myth of the PMF. But his request was for men to defend Iraq under the leadership of the government, not to form an independent terrorist group. Hardline groups did not respond to Najaf. Tehran replied. al-Sistani’s sole representative in Karbala has also publicly pushed for government arms control. His influence remains important, but it has not reached full control over these groups, and the current conflict makes it difficult to ignore.

Washington’s real prize, however, is hidden. Chevron is negotiating a deal to expand Iraq’s oil sector, while other US companies are pursuing gas, electricity and export contracts. Baghdad wants to increase production from 4.5 million barrels a day to 7 million within three years, although doing so would require a significant increase from OPEC. Western Iraq’s untapped gas reserves could one day propel the country into a major energy and export sector. This is the bonanza al-Zaidi is being asked to open in exchange for the loyalty Washington demands.

Kurdistan’s place in the coming order is still unclear. Barrack has called the old Baghdad-Erbil model “Balkanization”, a design he blames for Iran’s colonization. However, the same delegation spent a lot of time in June pressuring the Kurdish prime minister, Masrour Barzani, to reconstitute the Kurdistan parliament and form a new cabinet, not dissolve it. Read together, these positions convey a clear message: Washington wants the Kurdistan region to be functional, united, and stable within the Washington movement, not an independent movement and not related to the factions of Baghdad.

Stripped of the diplomatic varnish, Washington’s vision for Iraq is this: no military forces operating outside the state; no Iranian veto on Iraqi policy; there is not one group running the table from Baghdad; the European culture of an economy bound by contracts, not ideas; Strong American companies as the most profitable; he is a Prime Minister who answers, in practice, to Tom Barrack before he answers to his parliament. Whether Iraq is forced to comply with the Abraham Accords, whether the old world and Ba’athist currents are about to regain any air, whether the political parties lose their seats at the ballot box, these are predictions, not facts.

What sounds good is simple and visually appealing. Iraq spent two decades as a place where Iran and America fought indirectly, through proxies and sanctions. Now it’s becoming something else: a world where oil, banks and the military are all being negotiated at the same time under great pressure from the US. At the center of this change is the prime minister appointed in twenty-five minutes and is now expected to deliver by September 30.

The Gulf chain, from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to Manama, Kuwait, Doha and Muscat, took years to close. Whether Baghdad will survive the same pressure, or simply change the capital in response, is a question that al-Zaidi’s journey has not completely resolved.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.