How ISWAP and Boko Haram are reshaping Lake Chad | Military Issues

Abuja, Nigeria The killing of Abu-Bilal al-Minuki, the second-in-command of ISIL (ISIS), by the forces of the United States and Nigeria is a successful sign of the “fight against terrorism”. Yet for experts looking at the Lake Chad Basin, it shows just how persistent and critical the region’s insecurity has become.

Al-Minuki, a Nigerian from Borno State, was working outside the yard near Lake Chad, in the center of one of the world’s largest military weapons displays.

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His choice of the northeast of Nigeria as a base confirms the resurgence of violence by the group ISIL in West Africa Province (ISWAP) and its partner, Jama’at Ahl al-Sunna li al-Da’wa wa al-Jihad (JAS), known as Boko Haram.

Perhaps most important is the resurgence of Boko Haram, which has quietly rebuilt itself while security agencies have focused on the massive ISWAP.

“While the armed forces are focused on countering the ISWAP threats, perhaps because of the group’s superior capabilities, Boko Haram seems to have taken advantage of their enemy to regroup,” Nimi Princewill, a Sahel security expert, told Al Jazeera. “This also seems to have helped the two groups to strengthen their power and commit more violence in the region.”

Borders, weak governance, and violence are on the rise

Beyond the strategic management of Boko Haram and ISWAP, the resurgence of violence in the Lake Chad Basin also underscores the challenges of inter-organizational and intelligence-sharing between affected countries.

“Although Mali and Nigeria do not share a border, the vast Sahel that surrounds them has several borders that allow the movement of jihadi elements and their weapons.” What is happening in Mali has made the Sahel a place of tolerance for armed groups, increasing Nigeria’s risks through spillover dynamics, “Kabir Amadu, director of General Security in Nigeria.

Meanwhile, efforts by Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger to coordinate military operations have often been thwarted by operational difficulties, different legal systems, and uneven distribution, which allows armed forces to exploit gaps in small borders.

On the other hand, local communities face the twin pressures of insecurity and humanitarian deprivation, often relying on informal networks for protection and support, which may unwittingly harbor or move armed insurgents. Aid organizations say civilians are increasingly being displaced and forced into military service, while local security agencies are struggling to implement preventive measures that go beyond temporary military intervention.

In some areas, fear, mistrust, and weak patriarchal authority can make people vulnerable to coercion or influence by armed groups. These social tensions can create conditions that Boko Haram and ISWAP can exploit.

Economic factors also seem to be contributing significantly to the recovery of both groups. Controlling the islands of Lake Chad can provide leverage over tax routes, smuggling corridors, and disarmament, turning these islands into competitive territories that can be profitable beyond ideological goals.

Violent mechanics

The combination of armed forces and terrorists also appears to contribute to the formation of these groups. Boko Haram’s ideological and terrorist mix, including kidnapping and extortion, can help support its activities and attract disaffected youth. Employment appears to be affected by the social breakdown of the region, including extreme poverty and unemployment, not just by ideology.

The failure of rehabilitation programs is also thought to be a contributing factor to the problem, with ex-combatants rejoining Boko Haram after facing low life expectancy. An ISS investigation found that former members of ISWAP, who face execution for deserting their group, joined Boko Haram’s Ghazwah group in Borno, known for kidnapping and ransom operations.

In addition to financial and operational resources, these groups use gaps in common governance and security availability to consolidate influence. Remote areas often experience inconsistencies in the law, limited public services, and weak governance.

“ISWAP and Boko Haram have resumed operations in the Lake Chad Basin for three main reasons: their resilience and ability to adapt to the changing ways of the Nigerian military; the vast economy of violence that supports them with money and manpower; and the limited ability of the Nigerian government to establish a legitimate and permanent presence in the region that would undermine their political credibility,” said Chris Jadede.

Beyond the military

Many of the factors contributing to military threats in the Lake Chad Basin are unlikely to be resolved by military operations alone. The factors that give ISWAP and Boko Haram their recruitment base, financial support, and legitimacy in some areas can be traced back to years of poverty, displacement, governance gaps, and political inaccessibility.

Data from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) shows that the region hosts 2.9 million refugees, including 2.3 million in Nigeria. The violence has forced the closure of 1,827 schools across the Lake Chad Basin, with charities receiving only 19 percent of the funding needed in 2025.

“The recent resurgence of ISWAP and Boko Haram is not just a sign of military retreat, but the collapse of a deep regime across Lake Chad,” Abiola Sadiq, a security adviser, told Al Jazeera.

Lake Chad continues to face mounting challenges: millions are homeless, schools are closed, and humanitarian aid is insufficient. Armed groups use geographic and administrative opportunities to expand operations, while regional security cooperation struggles to adapt to their evolving nature.

“While the reported killing of ISIL leader Abu-Bilal al-Minuki may temporarily disrupt the rule of law, it may also lead to retaliatory violence as rival Jihadist groups compete for legitimacy, legitimacy, and territory,” Sadiq said.

In the weeks following the strike, law enforcement reports showed an increase in petty crime and cross-border crime, suggesting that the fragmentation of the groups had not reduced the groups’ ability to cooperate. Civilians continue to face travel restrictions and serious threats of recruitment, expropriation, and displacement.

“As Nigeria’s 2027 elections draw near, these groups are expected to increase their operations, which could lead to an increase in threats to the Lake Chad Basin region and northeast Nigeria,” Sadiq said.