Why the war in northern Mali has entered a dangerous new phase | Story

Bamako, Mali – An unprecedented alliance between the separatist group and the al-Qaeda affiliate has changed the conflict in northern Mali, shifting forces and deepening divisions as the war continues.

When the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) launched an alliance on April 25, 2026, the conflict entered a new phase.

The war that has plagued Mali for a long time with several armed groups has been replaced by a coordinated campaign from Kidal and Anefis to Tilemsi, Gao and Sevare, which has caused the biggest problem for the Malian army for years and for the Russian Africa Corps, the Kremlin-backed army that replaced the Wagner Group in Mali.

Since then, the war has been characterized by simultaneous strikes, ambushes, drone strikes and airstrikes, with both sides claiming major military victories.

Mr. Bamako said that he is working to restore the government’s authority and eliminate the so-called “terrorist alliance” between the FLA and JNIM.

The FLA says it is committed to the independence of Azawad, the name separatists use in northern Mali, while JNIM portrays the war as part of a campaign to “liberate” Mali and overthrow the government, which it accuses of relying on Russian forces.

More important than that disappointment, however, is the unprecedented military alliance between the separatist group and al-Qaeda.

Their political ambitions remain different, but their alliance has already changed the course of the conflict and could have significant implications for security in the Sahel.

The agreement emerged after the collapse of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement, which sought to end years of conflict between Bamako and northern armed forces through regional and political representation, but their implementation has repeatedly failed.

A series of military coups after 2020 also changed the political leadership and security mechanisms in Mali. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) suspended Mali and imposed sanctions, while Russia increased its military presence by deploying the Wagner Group at the end of 2021.

After Russia integrated the operations of the Wagner Group into the government-controlled Africa Corps, fighting again made it impossible for the government or the northern forces to establish peace.

How the partnership began

On paper, the alliance between FLA and JNIM seems unlikely. The FLA comes from northern separatist groups that declared independence for Azawad during the 2012 uprising, which was not recognized by Mali or the rest of the world.

It presents itself as a nationalist group seeking the independence of the Azawad, while the JNIM seeks to overthrow governments it deems illegitimate and establish a regime based on its interpretation of Islamic law.

However, officials from both groups told Al Jazeera that ideological differences have been put aside to fight a common enemy.

Colonel Mohamed Issa, the head of the FLA, said the group remained committed to an independent Azawad, saying previous agreements had repeatedly collapsed because successive governments in Bamako had failed to honor them.

Negotiations, he said, can be accepted if they recognize that Azawad has the right to secede.

Issa rejected the idea of ​​an ideological alliance, describing the relationship as a means of fighting against a common enemy.

He added that JNIM-affiliated fighters working with the FLA were only Azawads rather than members of the entire group, saying they were motivated mainly to protect their areas from the Malian army and what he called Russian “mercenaries”.

Suleiman, a JNIM group leader who asked that only his name be used for security reasons, described the relationship in detail.

He added that the group approved the working agreement with the FLA after internal discussions because the fighters on both sides are from the “same people” who are in the same struggle and because their freedom goals have been “unified”.

He added that the FLA endorsed Islamic legal dialogue with local religious scholars, one of the main goals of JNIM, a fact that the FLA did not say. Meanwhile, Bamako described the relationship as a “JNIM/FLA terrorist alliance” that threatens the Malian regime.

Various issues show the strength and weakness of this system. For now, shared interests in war seem to outweigh ideological differences. Whether this remains true as the debate rages on is not entirely certain.

Power fluctuations

The alliance has changed not only the battlefield but also the way war is fought.

FLA officials said that working together with JNIM has enabled both groups to share responsibilities and combine expertise in attacking troops and convoys.

Bamako disputes the casualty figures released by the armed forces and insists that its troops continue the operation. Even so, the conflict has escalated, with simultaneous attacks on remote areas, engagements lasting several days and ambushes targeting boosters before they reach the front lines.

Drones have taken on an ever-increasing role, serving not only as reconnaissance platforms but increasingly as weapons for attacking vehicles and military bases. Mali’s military, backed by Russia’s Africa Corps, continues to rely on air power, but months of continuous fighting show that neither side has gained a major advantage.

Economic wars

Long-established organizations and human trafficking continue to support both sides.

JNIM sources describe a cash flow built on local websites, zakat collections and resources collected over the years, including money linked to past al-Qaeda ransom operations.

The FLA says it relies mainly on donations organized by tribal leaders, businesses and community organizations.

Officials from both groups have also admitted that members of the group are involved in illicit financial activities, including trade in the Sahara region, although the extent to which these activities contribute to the war is difficult to prove.

Tools have become as important as money. Weapons have flown across the Sahel since the fall of Libya in 2011, giving armed forces a permanent supply.

The recent war has opened up another supply chain: weapons and military vehicles captured from the Malian army now form an important part of the arsenal of both groups.

Can either side win?

There are no signs that the conflict is over.

The Malian military maintains a visible advantage in air power, supported by Russia’s Africa Corps. However, FLA and JNIM continue to promote joint operations in northern Mali.

Military instability reflects political instability. Bamako is still committed to protecting the country of Mali, FLA insists on the freedom of Azawad and JNIM continues to seek the removal of the government.

Neither has changed position since the latest war began, and nothing has forced any of them to do so.

The competing goals also cast doubt on how long the two teams will continue to fight. Their alliance rests on a common enemy rather than a shared political vision, making his future uncertain.

A war without end

Three months into the latest conflict, northern Mali is still mired in conflict with no end in sight. The alliance between the FLA and JNIM has also changed the face of the conflict, with Bamako continuing to resist any consequences that would undermine the integrity of the Malian state.

What began as a conflict between governments and armed groups has turned into a conflict shaped by competing visions of independence, separatism, control by al-Qaeda-linked militias and the involvement of foreign powers.

Unless the competing ambitions – international integration, independence and regime change – are addressed alongside the fight, a meaningful dialogue will not be difficult.

Whatever happens next, the agreement reached in April 2026 has already changed the course of the war in northern Mali. Whether it endures or crumbles due to its competing ambitions, it has created a military and political reality whose consequences may extend beyond Mali’s borders.