‘Printed in blood’: Where is the China-North Korea relationship today? | | War Stories

Chinese leaders often explain Beijing’s relationship with North Korea close “like lips and teeth”, but as warm as the relationships between them appear, this is a relationship that is emphasized above all by the right importance.

On July 11, 1961, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and North Korean leader Kim Il Sung signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Assistance in Beijing. Sixty-five years later, the treaty is still in effect, with a self-defense clause that commits each side to support the other in the event of an armed attack. It is China’s permanent military agreement, which shows the importance of the agreement, but much has changed since it was signed.

A sign of the continued importance of the alliance came this week, with North Korean President Pak Thae Song’s three-day visit to Beijing to celebrate the friendship treaty.

But over the past 65 years, China has transformed itself from a poor developing country to a poor country the second largest economy in the worldwhile North Korea is still isolated and very permissive.

Yet their alliance has survived the Cold War, the opening of China’s economy to the world, the collapse of the Soviet Union and years of conflict over Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program.

Why has it gone beyond this? Neither side can afford to fail.

China wants stability

The China-North Korea alliance it was created during the Korean War, when US-led troops reached China’s border in 1950, and Beijing sent hundreds of thousands of troops into North Korea.

China called them “volunteers”, but they fought under Chinese orders and suffered many casualties. This shared history remains central to official discourse and the leaders of China and North Korea often describe the relationship as “sealed in blood”.

Their views are very similar to each other. Both are single-party states deeply suspicious of Western power, and both oppose the presence of American troops on the Korean Peninsula. Both accuse Washington of using treaties, sanctions and military coercion against countries that refuse to recognize its sovereignty. But the idea of ​​sharing only goes so far, as China embraces foreign investment, private enterprise and international trade.

Beijing presents itself as a reliable international partner and leader of the Global South, while North Korea has closed itself off from the rest of the world. Beijing’s rewards are obvious as Pyongyang often uses instability to gain attention, control or approval.

The most important thing for China is not a strong North Korea but a stable one. Beijing does not want the North Korean government to collapse, which could send more refugees across its 1,400km (870-mile) border and increase the chances of the Korean Peninsula being aligned with Washington. So North Korea acts as a buffer between China and the US presence in the region.

Beijing also does not want war, as this would disrupt trade in the region and lead to a nuclear crisis on China’s doorstep.

This explains how China is sometimes at odds – in the past it supported United Nations sanctions against North Korea’s nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons programs, while opposing measures it believed could destabilize the regime. It also continues to provide an important economic channel for Pyongyang as a major trading partner. China wants the North Korean government to be healthy, not stagnant or desperate.

North Korea wants options

For many years, China has been North Korea’s main friend and protector, but at the same time, Pyongyang does not want to fully rely on Beijing.

Its growing relationship with Moscow has taken a turn for the better, with North Korea and Russia in 2024 signing a joint peace treaty, including a mutual defense agreement. Since then, military and political cooperation between the two countries has grown significantly.

For North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Russia provides another powerful ally, more strategic space and access to military technology, energy and hard currency. For Beijing, this is both useful and unpleasant.

Russia can reduce the economic crisis by supporting North Korea and also strengthen the fight against US influence. But the war-torn relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang could also strengthen Kim’s nuclear ambitions and destabilize Northeast Asia – a region that sees him as his backbencher. Fortunately, China does not want to lose its influence over the North Korean government to Russia.

But regional security is also pulling Beijing and Pyongyang together, especially as the US strengthens its military alliances with South Korea and Japan, and the three countries hold regular military exercises and share intelligence.

Tokyo is also increasing defense spending, which has upset China over traditional fears about Japan’s expansionism. Meanwhile, South Korea continues to host thousands of American troops, which China sees as part of a US-led effort to contain it. North Korea sees this as preparation for war.

Although China’s and North Korea’s threats are not the same, they overlap, and because of this Beijing has focused on presenting a tough front with Pyongyang, even as it expands its relations elsewhere.

Essentials, not ideas

This relationship may not be the same for the next 65 years. North Korea appears to be growing bolder by strengthening its relationship with Moscow and taking a more moderate approach towards South Korea and the US.

China is the world’s greatest power, but it also has a lot to lose from the instability of the Korean Peninsula.

That dynamic change has become more visible. In the past, Beijing has publicly expressed dismay over North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests, while calling on Pyongyang to return to talks. Recently, the criticism of China has ended.

During his recent visit to Pyongyang, Xi Jinping did not mention nuclear weapons. Beijing appears compelled to push Kim into Vladimir Putin’s hands by criticizing his weapons program.

As China continues to strengthen its diplomatic power and push to reshape the world order to one in which the US and its allies are not the dominant force, it needs to have a limit – to stand by North Korea against what it sees as Western hegemony, but distance itself from the values ​​that make Pyongyang a religious state.